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Abstract
We propose and evaluate a number of solutions to the problem of calculating the cost to serve
each location in a single-vehicle transport setting. Such cost to serve analysis has application both
strategically and operationally in transportation. The problem is formally given by the traveling
salesperson game (TSG), a cooperative total utility game in which agents correspond to locations
in a travelling salesperson problem (TSP). The cost to serve a location is an allocated portion of the
cost of an optimal tour. The Shapley value is one of the most important normative division schemes
in cooperative games, giving a principled and fair allocation both for the TSG and more generally.
We consider a number of direct and sampling-based procedures for calculating the Shapley value,
and present the first proof that approximating the Shapley value of the TSG within a constant factor
is NP-hard. Treating the Shapley value as an ideal baseline allocation, we then develop six proxies
for that value which are relatively easy to compute. We perform an experimental evaluation using
Synthetic Euclidean games as well as games derived from real-world tours calculated for fast-
moving consumer goods scenarios. Our experiments show that several computationally tractable
allocation techniques correspond to good proxies for the Shapley value.
1. Introduction
We study transport scenarios where deliveries of consumer goods are made from a depot to locations
on a road network. At each location there is a customer, e.g. a vending machine or shop, that has
requested some goods, e.g. milk, bread, or soda. The vendor who plans and implements deliveries is
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faced with two vexing problems. First, the familiar combinatorial problem of routing and schedul-
ing vehicles to deliver goods cost effectively. Many varieties of this first problem exist (Golden,
Raghavan, & Wasil, 2008), and for our proposes we shall refer to it as the vehicle routing problem
(VRP). We begin our investigation supposing that VRP has been solved heuristically, and therefore
after the assignment of locations to routes has been made.
The second vexing problem is determining how to evaluate the cost to serve each location.
Specifically, the vendor must decide how to apportion the costs of transportation to each location
in an equitable and economically efficient manner. The results of cost to serve analysis have a
variety of important applications. Using the allocation directly the vendor can of course charge
locations their allocated portion of the transportation costs. More realistically, vendors use the
cost allocations when (re-)negotiating contracts with customers. Supply chain managers may also
reference a cost allocation when deciding whether or not to continue trade with a particular location.
Finally, provided market conditions are favourable, sales managers can be instructed to acquire new
customers in territories where existing cost allocations are relatively high in order to share the cost
of delivery among more locations.
Addressing the second vexing problem, this paper stems from our work with a fast-moving
consumer goods company that operates nationally both in Australia and New Zealand. The company
serves nearly 20,000 locations weekly using a fleet of 600 vehicles. Our industry partner is under
increasing economic pressure to realise productivity improvements through optimisation of their
logistical operations. A key aspect of that endeavour is to understand the contribution of each
location to the overall cost of distribution. In this study we focus at the individual route level for a
single truck, where we apportion the costs of the deliveries on that route to the constituent locations.
We formalise this setting as a traveling salesperson game (TSG) (Potters, Curiel, & Tijs, 1992),
where the cost to serve all locations is given by the solution to an underlying traveling salesperson
problem (TSP). Formalised as a game, we can use principled solution concepts from cooperative
game theory, notably the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), in order to allocate costs to locations in a
fair and economically efficient manner.
Calculating the Shapley value of a game is a notoriously hard problem (Chalkiadakis, Elkind,
& Wooldridge, 2011). A direct calculation for a TSG requires the optimal solution to exponentially
many distinct instances of the TSP. Sampling procedures can be used for approximating the value,
however these too do not offer a practical solution for larger games. Moreover, we prove that there
is no polynomial-time α-approximation of the Shapley value for any constant α ≥ 1 unless P=NP.
To circumscribe these computationally difficulties, this work explores six proxies1 for the Shapley
value. Our proxies offer tractable alternatives to the Shapley value, and in some cases appeal to other
allocation concepts from cooperative game theory (Peleg & Sudho¨lter, 2007; Curiel, 2008). Two of
our proxies appeal to the well-known Held-Karp and Christofides TSP heuristics, respectively.
We report a detailed experimental comparison of proxies using a large corpus of Synthetic Eu-
clidean games, and problems derived from real-world tours calculated for fast-moving consumer
goods businesses in the cities of Auckland (New Zealand), Canberra, and Sydney (Australia). We
highlight three computationally tractable proxies that give good approximations of the Shapley value
in practice. Our evaluation also considers the ranking of locations—least to most costly—induced
by the Shapley and proxy values. Ranking is relevant when, for example, we are just interested in
1. We use the word proxy instead of approximation to ease discussion and, technically, many of these measures are
stand-ins for the Shapley value, not approximations of it.
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identifying the most costly locations to serve. We again find that three of our proxies provide good
ranking accuracy taking the rank induced by the Shapley value as the target.
2. Preliminaries
We use the framework of cooperative game theory to gain a deeper understanding of our delivery
and cost allocation problems (Peleg & Sudho¨lter, 2007; Chalkiadakis et al., 2011). In cooperative
game theory, a game is a pair (N,c). N is the set of agents and the second term c : 2N → R is
the characteristic function. Taking S ⊆ N, c(S) is the cost of subset S. A cost allocation is a
vector x = (x0, . . . ,xn) denoting that cost xi is allocated to agent i ∈ N. We restrict our attention to
economically efficient cost allocations, which are allocations satisfying ∑i∈N xi = c(N).
For any cooperative game (N,c), a solution concept φ assigns to each agent i ∈ N the cost
φi(N,c). There may be more than one allocation satisfying the properties of a particular solution
concept, thus φ is not necessarily single-valued, and might give a set of cost allocations (Peleg
& Sudho¨lter, 2007). A minimal requirement of a solution concept is anonymity, meaning that the
cost allocation must not depend on the identities of locations. Prominent solution concepts include
the core, least core, and the Shapley value. For ε ≥ 0, we say that cost allocation φ is in the
(multiplicative) ε-core if ∑i∈S φi ≤ (1+ ε)c(S) for all S ⊆ N (Faigle & Kern, 1993). The 0-core is
referred to simply as the core. Both the core and ε-core can be empty. The ε-core which is non-
empty for the smallest possible ε is called the least core. This particular ε is referred to as the least
core value.2
Our work focuses on the single-valued solution concept called the Shapley value (Shapley,
1953). Writing SVi(N,c) for the Shapley value of agent i, formally we have:
SVi(N,c) = ∑
S⊂N\{i}
|S|!(|N|− |S|−1)!
|N|! (c(S∪{i})− c(S)). (1)
In other words, the Shapley value divides costs based on the marginal cost contributions of agents
In the traveling salesperson problem (TSP) a salesperson must visit a set of locations N =
{1, . . . ,n}∪{0} starting and ending at a special depot location 0. For i, j ∈ N ∪{0} i 6= j, di j is the
strictly positive distance traversed when traveling from location i to j. Here, di j = ∞ if traveling
directly from i to j is impossible. Taking distinct i, j,k ∈ N ∪{0}, the problem is symmetric if and
only if di j = d ji for all i, j ∈ N ∪{0}. It satisfies the triangle inequality if and only if di j + d jk ≥
dik (Garey & Johnson, 1979).
A TSP is Euclidean when each location is given by coordinates in a (two dimensional) Euclidean
space; therefore di j is the Euclidean distance between i and j. A Euclidean TSP is both symmetric
and satisfies the triangle inequality.
A tour is given by a finite sequence of locations that starts and ends at the depot 0. The length of
a tour is the sum of distances between consecutive locations. For example, the length of [0,1,2,0] is
d01+d12+d20. An optimal solution to a TSP is a minimum length tour that visits every location. It is
NP-hard to find an optimal tour, and generally there is no α-approximation for any α unless P=NP.
An α-approximation for a given optimisation problem is an algorithm that runs on an instance x and
returns a feasible solution F(x) which has cost c(F(x)) related to the optimal solution OPT (x) by
2. The 0-core of the transport game we focus on in this work can be empty. However, if the game is convex, the Shapley
value lies in the core (Tamir, 1989).
3
AZIZ, CAHAN, GRETTON, KILBY, MATTEI, & WALSH
the following relation (Papadimitriou, 1994):
|c(F(x))− c(OPT (x))|
max{c(OPT (x)),c(F(x))} ≤ α.
Informally, α is a bound on the relative error of an approximation function. When ∀i, j di j are
finite, the triangle inequality and symmetry hold, then polynomial-time approximations exist (Held
& Karp, 1962; Christofides, 1976).
Given a TSP, the corresponding traveling salesperson game (TSG) is a pair (N,c). N is the set of
agents which corresponds to the set of locations.3 The second term c : 2N → R is the characteristic
function. Taking S ⊆ N, c(S) is the length of the shortest tour of all the locations in S. A cost
allocation is a vector x = (x1, . . . ,xn) denoting that cost xi is allocated to location i ∈ N. For the
special depot location, we shall always take x0 = 0 (Potters et al., 1992)
3. Some Properties of the Shapley Value
The Shapley value has many attractive properties when used as a cost allocation scheme by a vendor.
For example, whereas the 0-core can be empty, and therefore not yield any allocation at all (Tamir,
1989), the Shapley value always exists in the TSG setting. The Shapley value is also, for general
games, the unique assignment of costs that satisfies three important properties: (1) anonymity, the
cost allocated to a particular location is dependent only on the impact it has to the total cost; (2)
efficiency, the entire cost of serving all N locations is allocated; and (3) strong monotonicity. The
latter states that if the total cost of a coalition is reduced, then the allocation to all locations partic-
ipating in that coalition is either reduced or not increased (Young, 1985). Formally, the marginal
contribution from player i to the total cost of coalition S is:
ci(S) =
{
c(S)− c(S\{i}) if i ∈ S
c(S∪{i})− c(S) if i /∈ S.
Strong monotonicity can be stated as: ∀S : ci(S)≥ c′i(S) =⇒ φi(N,c)≥ φi(N,c′). Due to these
and other derivative axiomatic properties, the Shapley value has been termed “the most important
normative payoff division scheme” in cooperative game theory (Winter, 2002).
Another important property of the Shapley value is that it would allocate any fixed costs incurred
when serving a location to that location alone. If we treat a variant of the TSG where some locations
have an associated fixed cost in addition to their transportation costs— e.g. parking and loading fees
—then the Shapley value will allocate those fixed costs to the associated locations. Formally, given a
fixed cost f (i) of serving location i, f (i) does not need to be removed before computing the Shapley
value, as follows. Suppose c is the characteristic function of the TSG defined above, and c′ satisfies
the identity c′(S) = c(S)+∑i∈S f (i).
Proposition 1 SVi(N,c′) = SVi(N,c)+ f (i).
3. From here on we focus on a restriction of general games to delivery games (TSGs) and therefore we use location
instead of agent for ease of exposition.
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Proof.
SVi(N,c) = ∑
S⊆N\{i}
(|S|!)(|N|− |S|−1)!(c(S∪{i})− c(S))/|N|!
= ∑
S⊆N\{i}
(|S|!)(|N|− |S|−1)!((c′(S∪{i})+ f (i))− c(S))/|N|!
= ∑
S⊆N\{i}
(|S|!)(|N|− |S|−1)!(c′(S∪{i})− c′(S))/|N|!+ ∑
S⊆N\{i}
(|S|!)(|N|− |S|−1)!( f (i))/|N|!
= SVi(N,c′)+( ∑
S⊆N\{i}
(|S|!)(|N|− |S|−1)!/|N|!)( f (i))
= SVi(N,c′)+(|N|!/|N|!)( f (i))
= SVi(N,c′)+( f (i))
q
We also have that by charging locations according to the Shapley value, we can expect to in-
centivize them to recruit new customers in their vicinity. Locations recruiting for a vendor can
reasonably expect to lower the transportation costs they are allocated. In detail, consider a ven-
dor trading with locations N = {1..|N|}. From the vendors perspective, adding a new location,
|N|+ 1, to an existing delivery route is clearly a good idea if the revenue generated by delivering
to that location is greater than the marginal cost c(N ∪{|N|+ 1})− c(N) of the new delivery. Be-
cause existing locations in the vicinity of |N|+ 1 are already paying for deliveries, charging at the
threshold c(N ∪{|N|+1})− c(N) however will typically be unfair. In that case existing customers
would likely be subsidizing new customers, and therefore disincentivize to find new business for the
vendor. The Shapley value mitigates this, and can be expected to provide recruitment incentives.
Making this discussion more concrete, suppose the game is a Euclidean scenario with N = {x} a
single agent at distance 100 from the depot and the new agent y is at distance 5 from x. The trans-
portation cost of serving {x,y} can be as high as 210. Clearly, charging the new agent at most
c({x,y})− c({x}) = 10 while x continues to pay around 200 is unfair. On the other hand, if the
vendor allocates costs according to the Shapley value, the existing customer’s costs decrease when
the new agent joins.
Related to the above discussion, if the characteristic function is concave then the Shapley value
lies in the non-empty 0-core. Formally, concavity is satisfied if for all S⊆N \{i} : c(S∪{i}∪{|N|+
1})− c(S∪{|N|+ 1}) < c(S∪{i})− c(S). Charging customers according to core values actually
guarantees that they are incentivized to recruit. Specifically, for all i ∈ N : SVi(N ∪{|N|+ 1},c) <
SVi(N,c). In other words, the Shapley allocation of costs to existing locations decreases when a
new customer |N|+1 is added. Unfortunately general TSGs do not necessarily have concave char-
acteristic functions. However, concavity in expectation is all that is required for existing locations
to realise savings. In practice there are synergies, and incentives for further recruitment on routes
where we charge according to the Shapley value. In our empirical data, even when the game is not
concave we frequently observe such incentives given a Shapley allocation. And compared to charg-
ing customers according to their marginal contribution to costs, we do not explicitly disincentivize
recruitment. Summarizing, if an agent knows that all locations are charged according to the Shapley
value, they can typically expect incentives to recruit new locations in their vicinity.
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4. Computing the Shapley Value
Our focus now shifts to calculation of the Shapley value. Considering games in general, it should
be noted that a direct evaluation of Equation 1 requires we sum over exponentially many quantities.
Such a direct approach to the calculation of the Shapley value is therefore not practical for any game
of a reasonable size. Indeed, starting from the earliest literature (Mann & Shapley, 1962), authors
motivate auxiliary restrictions and constraints, for example on the size and importance of coalitions,
in order to describe games where the Shapley value can be calculated. More recent literature pro-
poses a variety of approaches to directly calculate the Shapley value for certain games (Conitzer &
Sandholm, 2006; Ieong & Shoham, 2005), however efficient calculation of the value for TSGs has
remained elusive. We require an accurate baseline in order to experimentally evaluate the proxies
we later develop for the Shapley value of the TSG. To that purpose we investigate exact and general
sampling-based approximations of the Shapley value. We treat our transport setting specifically,
describing a novel procedure for an exact evaluation of the Shapley value of a TSG by following
Bellman’s dynamic programming solution to the underlying TSP. We also discuss how in general
the Shapley value can be evaluated approximated using a sampling procedure. We pursue that sam-
pling approach in TSGs, considering two distinct characterisations of the Shapley value which are
amenable to sampling-based evaluation. We performed a detailed empirical study of sampling-
based evaluations using Synthetic TSGs instances where the underlying TSP model is Euclidean. In
closing we give a hardness proof relating to the computation of the Shapley value of TSGs, showing
that approximation of the Shapley value in that game is intractable.
4.1 Dynamic Programming
We found that the steps performed by a dynamic programming (DP) solution to the underlying TSP
expose the margins—i.e. terms of the form c(S∪{i})− c(S)—that are summed over in a direct
evaluation of Equation 1. The Shapley value of a TSG can therefore be computed more-or-less as a
side effect while a DP procedure computes the optimal solution to the underlying TSP.
These ideas can be made concrete by following the procedure outlined by Bellman (1962). The
equations at the heart of that TSP solution procedure recursively define a cost function, c(S, j),
which is the shortest path through all locations in S starting at the depot 0 and ending at j.4
c({ j}, j) = d0 j
c(S, j) = min
k∈S,k 6= j
(c(S\{ j},k)+dk j)
Following the above recursive definition, a DP process iteratively tabulates c(S, j) for successively
larger coalitions S. At iteration n that procedure shall tabulate all quantities c(S, j) taking |S|= n. By
computing the values c(S,0) for |S| < |N|, we have access to the characteristic function evaluation
c(S) of subtours of locations in S, as follows:
c(S) = c(S,0) = min
j∈S
(c(S, j)+d j0).
4. Our notations depart slightly from Bellman’s seminal work. Whereas we take c(S, j) to be the cost of each optimal
tour-prefix path (i.e. starting at the depot 0 and ending at j), Bellman originally took c(S, j) to be the cost of optimal
tour-suffix paths starting from j, traversing the locations in S and ending at the depot 0.
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Therefore, one can incrementally evaluate the sum in Equation 1 for a TSG, while calculating opti-
mal subtours for progressively larger coalitions withing a classical DP procedure. Intuitively, as we
compute a tour using Bellman’s algorithm, by additionally evaluating c(S,0) for each encountered
subset S we obtain all quantities required to calculate the marginal costs of locations. It is worth
noting that the dynamic programming approach does not address the exponential number of subsets
we need to sum over in the evaluation of Equation 1. We have therefore highlighted a concrete
relationship between a classical procedure for the TSP and the Shapley value of the corresponding
TSG. However, this observation does not yield a practical algorithm for games with many more than
a dozen locations.
4.2 Sampling-Based Evaluation
Using either the DP solution, or indeed the state-of-the-art TSP solver Concorde (Applegate, Bixby,
Chvatal, & Cook, 2007) in a direct calculation of the Shapley value, we find it impractical to com-
pute the exact Shapley value for instances of the TSG larger than about 15 locations. A direct
method requires an exponential number of characteristic function computations, each requiring we
solved an NP-hard problem. To obtain an accurate baseline for reasonably sized games our investi-
gation now turns to sampling procedures. Indeed, because the Shapley value is a population average
it is reasonable to estimate the value using a sampling procedure.
The first use of sampling to approximate the Shapley value of games was proposed and studied
by Mann and Shapley (Mann & Shapley, 1960). Perhaps the most elegant and general method
proposed by Mann and Shapley is called Type-0 sampling. This method repeatedly draws uniformly
at random a permutation of the agents. The marginal cost of each agent i is then calculated, by taking
the difference in the cost of serving agents up to and including i in the permutation, and the cost
of serving the agents proceeding i. By repeatedly sampling permutations and the marginal costs of
including each agent i in this way, overtime we arrive at an unbiased estimate of the Shapley value.
Further elaboration of this procedure for the TSG is given below. Type-0 sampling has appeared
over the years in various guises, and is reported under a variety of different names in the literature
on approximating power indices—of which the Shapley value is but one—in coalitional games. A
recent variant of Type-0 sampling appears as the ApproShapley algorithm by Castro et al. in a paper
which proves asymptotic bounds on the sampling error of that method (Castro, Go´mez, & Tejada,
2009). ApproShapley shall be the focus of our sampling work, however prior to giving its details,
it is worth briefly reviewing other classes of game where sampling-based evaluations have been
explored. Bachrach et al. have previously examined Type-0 sampling in simple games—i.e. cost of
a coalition is either 0 or 1—deriving bounds that are probably approximately correct. In other words,
the actual Shapley value lies within a given error range with high probability (Bachrach, Markakis,
Resnick, Procaccia, Rosenschein, & Saberi, 2010). Continuing in this line of work, Maleki et
al. show that if the range or variance of the marginal contribution of the players is known ahead
of time, then more focused (termed stratified) sampling techniques may be able to decrease the
number of samples required to achieve a given error bound (Maleki, Tran-Thanh, Hines, Rahwan, &
Rogers, 2013). Other methods of approximating the Shapley value, specifically for weighted voting
games, have appeared in the literature including those based on multi-linear extensions (Leech,
2003; Owen, 1972) and focused random sampling (Fatima, Wooldridge, & Jennings, 2008, 2007)
To calculate the Shapley value of a TSG via sampling we employ the Type-0 method suggested
by Mann and Shapley (Mann & Shapley, 1960), called ApproShapley by Castro et al.. The pseu-
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docode is given in Algorithm 1. Writing pi(N) for the set of |N|! permutation orders of locations
N, taking Π ∈ pi(N) we write Πi for the subset of N which precede location i in Π. An alternative
formulation of the Shapley value can be characterised in terms of pi(N), by noting that value equates
with marginal cost of each location when we construct coalitions in all possible ways, as follows.
SVi(N,c) =
1
|N|! ∑Π∈pi(N)
(c(Πi∪{i})− c(Πi)) (2)
For each sampled permutation, ApproShapley evaluates the characteristic function for each
i ≤ |N| computing the length of an optimal tour for the set of locations in the i-sized prefix. By
construction, the cost allocation produced by ApproShapley is economically efficient. As a small
but important optimization, in our work we cache the result of each evaluation of the characteristic
function to avoid solving the same TSP twice.
Algorithm 1 ApproShapley
Input: N = {1, . . . ,n} locations with cost c(S) to serve a subset S⊆ N and m number of iterations.
Output: SVi for all i ∈ |N|
1 SV ← []
2 for i← 1 to |N| do
3 SVi← 0
4 end for
5 SampleNumber← 1
6 for SampleNumber← 1 to m do
7 Randomly select a permutation of the locations Perm from pi(N)
8 S← /0
9 for i← 1 to |N| do
10 S← S∪{Permi}
11 SVPermi ← SVPermi +(c(S)− c(S\{Permi}))
12 end for
13 end for
14 TotalValue← ∑i∈N SVi
15 for i← 1 to |N| do
16 SVi← SVi ∗ (c(N)/TotalValue)
17 end for
18 return SV
In our work, we also considered an alternative sampling method, which samples not over permu-
tations, but rather over subsets of locations as implied by the formulation in Equation 1 of Section 2.
There are fewer subsets than there are permutations, a fact which we supposed could be an advantage
in a sampling-based evaluation of the Shapley value. We name this method SubsetShapley, which by
construction also produces an economically efficient allocation. Later we empirically find the Sub-
setShapley performs worse than ApproShapley, however because this approach does not yet appear
in the literature we believe it worthy of discussion. SubsetShapley follows Algorithm 1 except for
Lines 7–10. In this case at every iteration of the loop at Line 6 we draw a set Si ⊆ N \{i} uniformly
at random for each location i. For each i, the update to SVi is then the weighted marginal contri-
bution, formally SVi ← SVi + |S|!(n− |S| − 1)!(c(S∪ i)− c(S)). The coefficient |S|!(n− |S| − 1)!
ensures that for each subset Si of locations sampled, we account for the number of permutations
where locations Si are ordered before location i.
8
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In order to test which sampling method performs best, we ran convergence tests on 50 random
instances for up to 5000 iterations. The instances were Euclidean TSGs on a 1,000x1,000 dimen-
sional square with 10 locations, each at coordinates given by a pair of 32-bit floating point numbers.
For each instance we calculated the exact Shapley value of every location, so that we could compare
the sampled allocations with their exact counterparts. Figure 4.2 graphically summarises the results
from this experimentation.
We find the ApproShapley method of sampling over permutations provides a faster convergence.
After as few as 100 iterations ApproShapley achieves an average error of ≈ 10% per location with a
maximum error of ≈ 20%. Additionally, the stability of the updates for ApproShapley, as measured
by the percentage of the allocation that is re-assigned per iteration, is already quite good after 40
iterations. ApproShapley quickly converges to a correct and stable answer which it continues to
refine as more samples are taken. In practice, ApproShapley achieves a lower error, earlier, and
continues to converge on an error of 0.0 faster than SubsetShapley.
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Figure 1: Comparison of the performance of ApproShapley (left) and SubsetShapley(right) for 100 iterations (top) and 5000 iterations
(bottom) for TSGs with 10 locations. The graphs show minimum and maximum (outside the graph range for SubsetShapley) error
in the Shapley value for a single location averaged over 50 instances. The error is computed as a percentage difference between
the actual Shapley value and the one computed by sampling. Additionally, the average percent error for all locations per iteration
is shown.
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4.3 Theoretical Hardness
We now consider, for the most general setting of the TSG, the difficulty of calculating the Shapley
value. Below we prove that the Shapley value of a location in the TSG cannot be approximated
within a constant factor in polynomial-time unless P = NP.
Theorem 2 There is no polynomial-time α-approximation of the Shapley value of the location in a
TSG for constant α ≥ 1 unless P = NP.
Proof. Let G(N,E) be a graph with nodes N and edges E. If an α-approximation exists we can
use it to solve the NP-complete Hamiltonian cycle problem on G. First, from G construct a complete
weighted and undirected graph G′(N,E ′), where (i, j) has weight 1 if (i, j) is in the transitive closure
of E, and otherwise has weight n!α . If there is a Hamiltonian cycle in G then the Shapley value of
any i ∈ N in the TSG posed by G′ is at most 1. Suppose there is no Hamiltonian cycle in G. We
show there exists a permutation pi of N that induces a large Shapley value for any node j as follows:
repeatedly add a node from N\ j to pi so that there remains a Hamiltonian cycle amongst elements
in pi; when there is no such node then add j. The marginal cost of adding j to pi is at least n!α .
The Shapley value of j is the average cost of adding it to a coalition S⊆ N \ j, therefore its Shapley
value is at least α . Even though edge weights in G′ are large, we can represent G′ compactly in
O(log(n)+n2 log(α)) space. An α-approximation on G′ for j therefore decides the existence of the
Hamiltonian cycle in G. q
5. Proxies for the Shapley Value
The use of ApproShapley requires that we solve an NP-hard problem each time we evaluate the
characteristic function. This is feasible for small TSG instances with less than a dozen locations,
however it does create an unacceptable computational burden in larger, realistically sized games.
We now describe a variety of proxies for the Shapley value that require much less computation in
practice.
For the purposes of the discussion below we assume that an optimal tour for the underlying TSP
is given. Not all our proxies yield economically efficient allocations of the cost of the optimal tour.
For that reason, we define proxies in terms of the induced fractional allocation of the cost of the
optimal tour. Later, we shall compare these fractional allocations to that induced by computing the
fractional Shapley value, formally φ SVi = SVi/∑ j∈n SVj. This formulation based on fractional alloca-
tions allows us to compare the cost allocations from all the proxies on equal footing, in a way that
would be used in operational contexts such as transport settings. This formulation also enables us
to efficiently—i.e. in the game theoretic sense—allocate the cost of the optimal route only having
to solve the NP-hard TSP once.
5.1 Depot Distance (φDEPOT)
The distance from the depot — i.e. di0 for location i — is our most straightforward proxy. We
allocate cost to location i proportional to di0. The fraction allocation to location i is
φDEPOTi =
di0
∑ni=1 di0
.
For this proxy, a location that is twice as distant from the depot as another has to pay twice the cost.
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5.2 Shortcut Distance (φ SHORT)
Another proxy that is straightforward to calculate and which has been used in commercial routing
software is the shortcut distance. This is the marginal cost savings of skipping a location when
traversing a given optimal tour. With no loss of generality, suppose the optimal tour visits the
locations according to the sequence [0,1,2, . . . ]. Formally, SHORTi = di−1,i+di,i+1−di−1,i+1, where
locations 0 and n+1 are the depot, and di j is the cost of travel from location i to j. The fractional
allocation given by the shortcut distance is then
φ SHORTi =
SHORTi
∑ j∈N SHORT j.
5.3 Re-routed Margin (φREROUTE)
For a location i ∈ N, REROUTEi is defined as c(N)− c(N\i)). The allocation to a player can be
computed with at most two calls to an optimal TSP solver. The fractional allocation is
φREROUTEi =
(c(N)− c(N\i))
∑ j=N(c(N)− c(N\ j))
.
5.4 Christofides Approximation (φCHRIS)
A more sophisticated proxy is obtained if we use a heuristic when performing characteristic function
evaluations in ApproShapley, rather than solving the individual induced TSPs optimally. For this
proxy we use sampling to estimate the Shapley value and we use an approximation algorithm to
estimate the underlying TSP cost. To approximate the underlying TSP characteristic function, the
Christofides heuristic (Christofides, 1976), an O(N3) time procedure is used. To obtain a fractional
quantity φCHRISi , we divide the allocation to location i by the sum total of allocated costs. Assuming a
symmetric distance matrix satisfying the triangle inequality, the Christofides heuristic is guaranteed
to yield a tour that is within 3/2 the length of the optimal tour.
We briefly describe how the heuristic operates. The TSP instance is represented as complete
undirected graph G = (V,E), with one vertex in V for each location, and an edge E between every
distinct pair of vertices. For i, j ∈ V the edge (i, j) ∈ E has weight di j. A tour is then obtained as
follows: (1) compute the minimum spanning tree (MST) for G, (2) find the minimum weight perfect
matching for the complete graph over vertices with odd degree in that MST (typically performed
using the Hungarian algorithm), (3) calculate an Eulerian tour for the Euler multigraph obtained by
adding edges from Step (2) to the MST from Step (1), and (4) obtain a final tour for the TSP by
removing duplicate locations from the Eulerian tour.
5.5 Nested Moat-Packing (φMOAT)
A cost allocation method based on a nested moat-packing was first introduced by Faigle, Fekete,
Hochsta¨ttler, and Kern (1998). This allocation is obtained by apportioning a grand-coalition cost
equal to the value of the Held-Karp (Held & Karp, 1962) relaxation of the underlying TSP, mul-
tiplied by a constant factor. It is worth briefly considering some details of the background of this
approach, and the geometric intuitions.
The value of the Held-Karp relaxation of a TSP instance corresponds to a fairly tight lower
bound on the length of an optimal tour. That value is a lower bound for the TSP in the usual sense
12
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Figure 2: Depicts an optimal nested moat-packing, and the optimal tour (blue-line) for a TSP sce-
nario with 6 locations. The locations are indicated by their digit labels (e.g. “1”, “2”,
. . .), and occur at the center of the green moats, which appear as disks. Each green disk
depicts a distinct moat associated with one location. The orange region is the moat as-
sociated with the set of locations {5,6}. Following the nesting-scheme, the orange moat
surrounds an internal region comprising the green moats around locations 5 and 6, re-
spectively. There are 7 moats in total, and the optimal tour in this case traverses the width
of each moat exactly twice.
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– i.e. it is less than or equal to the length of an optimal tour. By multiplying this value by a small
factor, specifically 1.5, one can obtain an upper bound. The approach discussed here allocates
costs to locations so that the sum of allocated costs equates with that upper bound. The allocation
gives 12 -core values provided the distance matrix is symmetric and satisfies the triangle inequality.
Formally, where Pi is the cost of location i, the moat-packing solution satisfies ∑i∈N Pi ≥ c(N) and
∀S ⊆ N : ∑i∈S Pi ≤ (1+ ε)c(S). It is is known that ε ≤ 12 and conjectured that ε ≤ 13 . In this
work we induce a fractional allocation, written φMOATi , by normalizing as we have done for other
proxies. The solution to the Held-Karp relaxation, and therefore the moat-packing allocation, has an
interesting geometric interpretation which we briefly discuss (see Cook, Cunningham, Pulleylank,
and Schrijver (1998) for a longer exposition). A graphic providing concrete examples of the required
concepts is in Figure 2. Our discussion distinguishes the concept of a point, a geometric point given
by its coordinates, and a location, which is a point that corresponds to a customer in the underlying
TSP. The proposed allocation is calculated by surrounding locations using a set of geometrically
nested reagions called moats. For example, in Figure 2 we have 6 locations, each of which has its
own green moat. In our graphic the locations 5 and 6 have their own green moats that describe an
interior region which is then surrounded by an outer orange moat. A moat is defined by an interior
region, containing the set of locations we are surrounding with the moat, and a surrounding contour.
The interior region occurs in the space encapsulated by the moat. That moat is the region between
the boundary of the interior region and the surrounding contour. The smallest distance between a
point in the interior region and one on the surrounding contour is greater than or equal to zero. The
minimum such distance gives the width of the moat. Finally, there can be no locations in a moat.
As is usual in our setting, we need only consider moats comprising the set of points whose minimal
straight-line distance to a point in the interior region is less than or equal to the moat width. For
example, taking the interior region for a single location to consist only of its single point, the moat is
the region between that point and a circle contour of constant radius. The radius of that circle is the
width of the moat. Concretely, the green disks in Figure 2 depict circular moats around individual
locations. To obtain a cost allocation, moats are arranged so that for a vehicle to visit the set of
locations in the underlying TSP, that vehicle must traverse the width of each moat at least twice.
Choosing moats in order to to maximise the sum of their widths, the distance traversing all chosen
moats twice corresponds to the value of the Held-Karp lower bound. One obtains an ε-core value by
allocating each moat width twice to locations outside the moat, and then scaling those allocations,
here by the constant factor 1.5, to ensure the sum of allocated costs exceeds the length of an optimal
tour.
A compilation of the above ideas is expressed mathematically below in the constraints and
optimisation criterion in Equation 3. Formally, the moat width, wS, for a set of locations S ⊆ N is
calculated by solving the LP in Equation 3. Below, taking the TSP as given by a weighted fully
connected graph, we use the notation δ (S) for the set of edges joining locations in S to locations in
N \S.
max
(
2∑S⊆N S 6≡ /0 wS
)
s.t.
wS ≥ 0 ∀S⊆ N S 6≡ /0
∑i j∈δ (S)wS ≤ di j ∀i, j ∈ N
(3)
The dual of this LP corresponds to the well-known Held-Karp relaxation of the TSP, which can be
solved in polynomial-time.
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Once a small set of non-zero wS terms are computed as per Equation 3, a nested packing
is obtained by following the post-processing procedure described by O¨zener, Ergun, and Savels-
bergh (2013). A packing is nested if and only if ∀S′,S′′ s.t. wS′ > 0 and wS′′ > 0, if S′∩S′′ 6≡ /0 then
either S′ ⊆ S′′ or S′′ ⊆ S′. For any optimal solution to Equation 3 there is a corresponding nested
packing with the same objective value (Cornue´jols, Naddef, & Pulleyblank, 1985). The nested con-
straint is required and, intuitively, it prevents overcharging a subset of locations that coalesce in a
moat – i.e. prevents the allocation from violating the universally quantified constraint in the defini-
tion of the core. For the nesting critera to be violated there must be three distinct non-empty sets
of locations S, S′ and S′′, so that wS∪S′ > 0 and wS′∪S′′ > 0. Post-processing iteratively identifies
and eliminates such cases. Identification is straightforward. For each elimination we take the as-
signment τ ←min{wS∪S′ ,wS′∪S′′}, and make the following assignment updates to the moat widths:
wS← wS+ τ , wS′′ ← wS′′+ τ , wS∪S′ ← wS∪S′− τ , and wS′∪S′′ ← wS′∪S′′− τ . This iterative procedure
terminates yielding a nested packing, however the algorithm can take exponential time in the worst
case. That being said, in all our experiments we found that nesting takes only a fraction of a second.
Finally, an ε-core allocation is obtained where, for each S ⊆ N we distribute the cost 3×wS arbi-
trarily to the locations in the set (N\0)\S – we distribute the term evenly to all nodes outside that
moat for S, excluding the depot node 0.
5.6 Hybrid Proxy
Early on in our experimentation, we made an important observation that lead us to develop a sixth
“blended” proxy, φBLEND. This proxy is a linear combination of φMOAT and φDEPOT. We experimen-
tally identify a λ ∈ [0,1] for which λ ×φMOAT +(1−λ )×φDEPOT provides an improved proxy for
φ SV compared to either component proxies in isolation.
Our observation is that the φMOAT does not properly distribute the depot allocation of moat
widths to other locations. In order to stay within the 1/2-core allocation, that width is distributed
in equal parts to all locations. Blending the φMOAT with φDEPOT mitigates this problem, and as we
observe, increases proxy accuracy relative to φ SV. The value of the improvement seems to decrease
gradually as the size of games increases. Figure 3 plots the benefit of blending proxies at different
values of λ in our corpus of Synthetic games and the in a corpus of Real-World transport scenarios.
A detailed description of the Real-World scenarios is given later in Section 7. Experimentally we
found λ = 0.6 to be most effective in Synthetic games. A clear signal for the optimal value of λ in
Real-World games is not obvious, however there is clear support in our data for blending the moat
and depot distances proxies. The graphs in Figure 3 show the average and worst case error in cost
allocation to a particular location. We also measured the root mean squared error (RMSE) over
all locations. The RMSE did not provide a clear signal to support a particular blending parameter,
though it did remain clear that blending performed better than either proxy in isolation for both bot
Synthetic and Real-World games.
15
AZIZ, CAHAN, GRETTON, KILBY, MATTEI, & WALSH
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentage of Hybrid that is Moat
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 A
b
so
lu
te
 E
rr
o
r 
b
e
tw
e
e
n
 S
h
a
p
le
y
 a
n
d
 H
y
b
ri
d Maximum Error per Blend Percentage
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentage of Hybrid that is Moat
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 A
b
so
lu
te
 E
rr
o
r 
b
e
tw
e
e
n
 S
h
a
p
le
y
 a
n
d
 H
y
b
ri
d Average Error per Blend Percentage
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentage of Hybrid that is Moat
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 A
b
so
lu
te
 E
rr
o
r 
b
e
tw
e
e
n
 S
h
a
p
le
y
 a
n
d
 H
y
b
ri
d Maximum Error per Blend Percentage for Combined
10 Players
20 Players
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentage of Hybrid that is Moat
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 A
b
so
lu
te
 E
rr
o
r 
b
e
tw
e
e
n
 S
h
a
p
le
y
 a
n
d
 H
y
b
ri
d Average Error per Blend Percentage for Combined
10 Players
20 Players
Figure 3: Effect of the blending parameter λ on the error of Shapley allocation prediction for all
of the Synthetic datasets (top) and all of the Real-World scenarios (bottom). The left-
hand graph shows the average worst case error measured at any single location, while the
right-hand graph shows the average error over all locations.
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6. Analysis of Naı¨ve Proxies
We refer to the three proxies φDEPOT, φ SHORT and φREROUTE, as being naı¨ve. Contrastingly, we call
φCHRIS, φMOAT and φBLEND the sophisticated proxies. The formulation of the naı¨ve proxies φDEPOT
and φ SHORT make them amenable to direct analysis of their worst case performance. We consider
settings where the naı¨ve proxies φDEPOT and φ SHORT can perform quite badly.
In order to illustrate this, consider a TSG where the depot is at one corner of a square of dimen-
sion a with one location at each of the other 3 corners. Locations nearest the depot are indexed 1
and 3, and the third location indexed 2.
Depot
Location 1
Location 3
Location 2
a
a
a a
Our naı¨ve proxies yield the following allocations:
i φ SV φDEPOT φ SHORT
1,3 0.299a 0.293a 0.333a
2 0.402a 0.415a 0.333a
Observe φDEPOT performs well in this case (maximum of≈ 11% error) while φ SHORT does not (min-
imum of ≈ 16% error).
We now identify some pathological cases on which the φ SHORT and φDEPOT proxies perform
poorly. Our first result demonstrates that φDEPOT and φ SHORT may under-estimate the true Shapley
value badly.
Theorem 3 There exists an n location TSP problem on which, for some location i, the ratio φDEPOTi /φ SVi
goes to 0 as n goes to ∞. For the same problem the ratio φ SHORTi /φ SVi goes to 0 as n goes to ∞ for Θ(n)
of the locations.
Proof. Suppose the first n−1 locations are at distance a from the depot, whilst the nth location is
located at a distance a in the opposite direction from the depot.
Locations 1, . . . ,n−1
a
Location n
a
Depot
Note that the normalization constant for φ SV, ∑ j∈n SVj = 4a. Now φ SVn = 2a/4a = 1/2 since the cost
of adding the nth location to any coalition is 2a. Leaving, for i < n,
φ SVi =
2a/(n−1)
4a
=
1
2(n−1) .
On the other hand, the normalization constant for φDEPOT, ∑ni=1 di0 = na since all locations are
equidistant from the depot. Giving, for all i≤ n, φDEPOTi = 1n .
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Thus for i < n,
φDEPOTi
φ SVi
=
1/n
1/2(n−1)
=
2n−1
n
which goes to 2 as n→ ∞. While
φDEPOTn
φ SVn
=
1/n
1/2
=
1
2n
which goes to 0 as n→ ∞.
Note that the shortcut proxy, φ SHORT performs poorly on this example. For i < n, φ SHORTi = 0
since all the locations are co-located, leaving φ SHORTn = 1. For i< n we have φ SVi = 1/2(n−1). Thus,
for i < n,
φ SHORTi
φ SVi
=
0
1/2(n−1)
= 0
and
φ SHORTn
φ SVn
=
1
1/2
= 2
q
Our second result demonstrates that φDEPOT can also over-estimate the true Shapley value badly.
Theorem 4 There exists an n location TSG where the ratio φ SVi /φDEPOTi goes to 0 as n goes to ∞ for
Θ(n) of the locations.
Proof. Suppose the first n−1 locations are at distance a from the depot, whilst the nth location is
located at a distance (n+1)a from the depot in the opposite direction.
Locations 1, . . . ,n−1
a
Location n
a(n+1)
Depot
Note that the normalization constant for φ SV, ∑ j∈n SVj = 2a+2a(n+1) = 2a(n+2). The Shapley
value SVi for any i < n is 2an−1 , thus
φ SVi =
2a/n−1
2a(n+2)
=
1
(n−1)(n+2) .
While the fractional Shapley allocation for location n is
φ SVn =
2a(n+1)
2a(n+2)
=
1
2
.
The normalization constant for φDEPOT is ∑ni=1 di0 = a(n− 1)+ a(n+ 1) = 2an. For location n
the assignment from the distance based proxy is
φDEPOTn =
a(n+1)
2an
=
n+1
2n
.
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For i < n,
φDEPOTi =
a
2an
=
1
2n
.
Thus, for location n we have
φ SVn
φDEPOTn
=
1/2
n+1/2n
=
2n
2n+1
which goes to 1 as n goes to ∞.
For i < n we have
φ SVi
φDEPOTi
=
1/(n−1)(n+2)
1
2n
=
2n
(n−1)(n+2)
which goes to 0 as n goes to ∞.
For the φ SHORT we again have i< n, φ SHORTi = 0 leaving φ SHORTn = 1. Thus, φ
SV
n /φ SHORTn = 1/2 while
for i < n, φ SVi /φ SHORTi is undefined. q
Our third result demonstrates that φ SHORT may under-estimate the Shapley value badly even on
very simple examples which may be embedded in larger problems.
Theorem 5 There exists a 2 location TSG instance for which φ SHORT/φ SV = 0 for one of the two
locations.
Proof. Suppose the first location is located a distance a from the depot with the second location
located a distance of a farther down the road.
Location 1
a
Location 2
a
Depot
For the first location we have φ SHORT1 = 0, as removing it has no effect on the distance we must
travel to the second location. This leaves φ SHORT2 = 1. The Shapley value for the first location is
SV =
2a
2
+
0
2
= a.
Which gives φ SV = a/4 and thus
φ SHORT
φ SV
=
0
a/4
= 0.
q
Our fourth and final result demonstrates that φ SHORT may over-estimate the Shapley value badly.
Theorem 6 There exists a four location TSG for which φ SV/φ SHORT = 0 for two of the four cities.
Proof. Consider a four location TSG where locations 1 and 2 are ε from each other and the depot
while cities 3 and 4 are at a distance a from the depot and ε from each other.
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Location 1
Location 2
Location 4
Location 3
εε
ε
ε
ka
ka
Depot
We note that here ε << ka, as such we will hide ε terms in O(ε). The marginal cost saved
by skipping any location is ε , this means that all locations have the same allocation according to
φ SHORT, namely for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,4}, φ SHORTi = 1/4.
Note that the normalization constant for φ SV, ∑ j∈n SVj = 2ka+O(ε). To compute the Shapley
values for locations 1 and 2 we observe that, in any given permutation, each location adds a multiple
of ε , thus by symmetry, for i ∈ {3,4},
φ SVi =
O(ε)
2ka+O(ε)
To compute the Shapley value for locations 3 and 4 we observe that, no matter where in the per-
mutation they appear, the first contributes 2ka while the other contributes only ε . Consequently, by
symmetry, for locations i ∈ {3,4},
φ SVi =
2ka+O(ε)
2
2ka+O(ε)
=
1
2
.
Thus, locations i ∈ {1,2}, we have
φ SV
φ SHORT
=
O(ε)
2ka+O(ε)
1/4
=
4O(ε)
2ka+O(ε)
.
The term goes to 0 as k goes to ∞.
q
7. Empirical Study
We implemented each of the six proxies discussed, along with a version of ApproShapley that uses
Concorde (Applegate et al., 2007) to evaluate the characteristic function of the TSG. The Concorde
program is used to find optimal solutions to TSPs. Rather than calculating φ SV by direct enumer-
ation as a baseline to compare proxies, we estimate that value using ApproShapley with Concorde.
For the size of games we have considered, we find that 4000 iterations of ApproShapley to be suffi-
cient to obtain accurate baseline values.
We experimented using a corpus of games comprised of two sets of TSGs. The first set of
games are Synthetic. For each i ∈ [4, . . . ,35], we generate 20 instances of the Euclidean TSG with i
locations occurring uniformly at random in a square of dimension 1,000. The horizontal and vertical
coordinates of the locations are represented using 32-bit floating point numbers. Those Euclidean
games are available online at http://users.cecs.anu.edu.au/~charlesg/tsg_euclidean_
games.tar.gz.
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The second set of games is taken from large Real-World VRPs in the cities of Auckland, New
Zealand; Canberra, Australia; and Sydney, Australia. Heuristic solutions to those VRPs are calcu-
lated using the Indigo solver (Kilby & Verden, 2011). That is a flexible heuristic which implements
an Adaptive Large Neighbourhood Search, the basic structure of which is described in detail by
Ropke and Pisinger in (Ropke & Pisinger, 2006). 5 To give an indication of the scale and difficulty
of these VRPs, the Auckland model comprises 1,166 locations to be served using a fleet of at most
25 vehicles over a 7 day period. In the heuristic solution we collect tours of length 10 and 20 to
created TSGs for testing. Because Real-World distance matrices are asymmetric, in all cases asym-
metry is negligible, we induce symmetric problems by resolving for the greater of di j and d ji – i.e.
setting di j = d ji = max{di j,d ji}. It total we obtain 69 Real-World games of size 10 and 44 games
of size 20. 6
All experiments reported here were performed on a computer with an Intel i7-2720QM CPU
running at 2.20GHz, with 8GB of RAM, and running the Ubuntu 12.04.3 LTS operating system. For
Synthetic problems with 35 locations, 4000 iterations of ApproShapley with exact TSP evaluations
using Concorde (Applegate et al., 2007) takes 545 seconds. Computing φCHRIS, which replaces
the exact TSP computation with an evaluation of the Christofides heuristic, results in a reduction
to 11.39 seconds in total. Computing φMOAT takes under 1 second. All the naı¨ve proxies, namely
φDEPOT, φ SHORT, and φREROUTE, take fractions of a second to compute.
Our experimental analysis assumes the reader is familiar with a number of statistical measures
which we summaries in Appendix A. To evaluate how well proxies perform in approximating φ SV
we measure the point-wise root-mean-squared error (RMSE) in each game. We also use Kendall’s
τ (Kendall, 1938) (written KT) to compare the ranking—i.e. least expensive to most expensive—of
locations induced by the Shapley allocation and our proxies. The value τ measures the amount of
disagreement between two rankings. It is customary to report τ as a normalized value (correlation
coefficient) between 1 and -1, where τ = 1 means that two lists are perfectly correlated (equal) and
τ =−1 means that two lists are perfectly anti-correlated (they are equal if one list is reversed). Our
analysis makes use of the significance, or p-value of a computed τ . The p-value is computed using
a two-tailed t-test where the null hypothesis is that there is no correlation between orderings (τ = 0).
Taking our significance threshold to be the customary 0.05, we can reject the null hypothesis when
p ≤ 0.05. When p ≥ 0.05 we fail to reject the null hypothesis, a p-value ≤ 0.05 is a statistically
significant result. This means it is unlikely that two random, uncorrelated lists would show such a
high degree of correlation.
7.1 Synthetic Data
Figure 4 shows the average root mean squared error and average KT distance for each proxy from
φ SV for all game sizes of the Synthetic data. A complete set of tables and results from the Synthetic
Data can be found in Appendix B. We describe highlights of our results here. Overall, the best
performing proxy is φBLEND, both in terms of lowest RMSE and highest average τ . The φ SHORT
and φREROUTE proxies are by far the worst, particularly in terms of approximating Shapley value,
5. Indigo is a strong vehicle routing solution platform, recently computing 5 new best solutions for 1,000 cus-
tomer problems from the VRPTW benchmark library. The solutions computed using Indigo were certified
by Dr. Geir Hasle, Chief Research Scientist at SINTEF and maintainer of the VRPTW benchmark library, as
the best currently known on September 24th of 2013. http://www.sintef.no/Projectweb/TOP/VRPTW/
Homberger-benchmark/1000-customers.
6. Due to commercial agreements with our industrial partners we cannot release these Real-World games.
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but also in terms of the ranking induced by the corresponding allocations. The computationally
more expensive proxy φREROUTE always dominates φ SHORT; a trend which continues throughout our
testing on Real-World data as well. The proxy φDEPOT performs poorly at ranking, however does
surprisingly well at approximation being almost competitive with the more sophisticated proxies.
In ranking locations, φREROUTE regularly identifies the location ranked most costly according to
the Shapley value, outperforming all proxies on this task for the synthetic data. More generally, in
≥ 60% of synthetic games the φCHRIS, φMOAT, φREROUTE, and φBLEND proxies each correctly identifies
the most costly location.
In the majority of the synthetic games, our analysis of rankings using Kendall’s τ strongly im-
plies that φCHRIS, φMOAT and φBLEND rankings are correlated with φ SV. Put simply, we are confident
that sophisticated proxies are inducing a ranking that is similar to the one induced by the Shapley
value. They also reliably identify the most expensive location. Among the pure proxies, the φCHRIS
proxy outperforms all the others at ranking by a slim margin. For example, it is able to identify the
most expensive location according to the Shapley value 66.4% of the time. Additionally, regardless
of the number of locations, the mean value for τ between φ SV and φCHRIS is≥ 0.55, and in every in-
stance with 18 or more locations (and for the majority of instances between 4 and 17 locations) there
is a statistically significant result for τ . Comparatively, φBLEND returns similar (and often higher)
results for τ while achieving a statistically significant correlation with the ranking induced by φ SV
for every synthetic game instance with more than 8 players, save 6. The τ analysis in the case of
φMOAT is less positive, gives strong correlation in instances with more than 20 locations, though still
better than any of the naive proxies.
Our experimental analysis also considered how the types of allocation error differ between prox-
ies. For example, we considered questions, such as: Do the proxies make a lot of small errors for low
cost locations, or do they make large errors for locations that are apportioned large costs? Knowl-
edge about the type and severity of errors made by our different proxies provides some guidance to
the situations where we should have confidence in proxy allocations and/or the induced rankings.
Figure 5 shows the absolute error between each of the proxies and φ SV graphed as a function of
the allocation according to φ SV. For all the proxies, there appears to be a strong linear component
to the error — many of the proxies allocate proportionally more (or less) cost compared to the φ SV
allocation. In some cases φREROUTE allocates more than 20-times the cost allocation by φ SV, though
typically this happens in the case of locations that received less than 10% of the Shapley allocation.
We find that better performing proxies make more constant real-valued errors across all locations,
regardless of actual allocation. The scatterplots for φBLEND and φCHRIS both show the weakest linear
bias, with φBLEND showing a somewhat sub-linear bias. For example, φCHRIS and φMOAT can allocate
6-times φ SV, though this only occurs in the case of locations whose Shapley allocation is less that
5% of the tour cost. Measuring the factor by which it overestimates allocations, the φDEPOT proxy
appears to perform rather well, allocating at most 2.5-times the fair cost. The caveat is that φDEPOT
is indiscriminate, also making proportionately large over-allocation errors to locations which are
costly according to φ SV.
7.2 Real-World Data
Measuring the performance of proxies in Real-World data from Auckland, Canberra, and Sydney,
overall we find the quality of allocation is slighly degraded compared to measurements we made in
synthetic games. We identified no significant performance differences between cities. A complete
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Figure 4: Performance of the five pure proxies and one hybrid proxy according to: (left) RMSE
averaged over the 20 games generated for each number of locations, and (right) Kendall’s
tau rank correlation averaged over the 20 games generated for each number of locations.
The error bands correspond to plus or minus one standard deviation. The horizontal axis
of our Kendall’s tau plot has been inverted for ease of comparison – i.e. more correlated
lists are towards the bottom of the graph (1.0).
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Figure 5: Absolute value of the difference between the φ SV and φ PROXY plotted as a function of
φ SV for all the points in the Synthetic data for all game sizes. Note that these are log-log
plots to highlight the spread of the data.
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set of tables and results for each of the cities can be found in Appendices C through E; we report
on the combined statistics of these games in this section. Summary statistics for these games are
shown in Tables 1 through 4.
10 Locations 20 Locations All Games
RMSE St. Dev. RMSE St.Dev. RMSE St. Dev.
Shortcut Distance 0.4429 0.1436 0.3239 0.1064 0.3966 0.1291
Re-routed Margin 0.4160 0.1328 0.2902 0.0934 0.3670 0.1175
Depot Distance 0.1346 0.0616 0.0870 0.0303 0.1160 0.0494
Moat Packing 0.2478 0.1247 0.1969 0.0883 0.2280 0.1105
Christofides 0.1338 0.0694 0.0863 0.0311 0.1153 0.0545
60/40 Moat/Depot 0.1442 0.0697 0.0765 0.0301 0.1178 0.0542
Table 1: Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) and Standard Deviation (St. Dev.) for the combined
Real-World datasets for games with 10 and 20 locations. Lower is better.
10 Locations 20 Locations All Games
τ St. Dev. τ St. Dev. τ St. Dev.
Shortcut Distance -0.0135 0.2692 0.0798 0.1891 0.0228 0.2380
Re-routed Margin 0.3578 0.2388 0.3476 0.1993 0.3538 0.2234
Depot Distance 0.1062 0.2382 0.1622 0.2313 0.1280 0.2355
Moat Packing 0.3450 0.2554 0.3064 0.1710 0.3300 0.2225
Christofides 0.2464 0.2770 0.3509 0.2258 0.2871 0.2571
60/40 Moat/Depot 0.2037 0.2524 0.2531 0.2487 0.2229 0.2510
Table 2: Average KT distance (τ) and Standard Deviation (St. Dev.) for the combined Real-World
datasets for games with 10 and 20 locations. Higher is better; +1 means the two lists are
perfectly correlated and −1 means the two lists are perfectly anti-correlated.
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Median Num. Significant
10 Locations 20 Locations 10 Locations 20 Locations
Shortcut Distance 0.4564 0.3349 3 4
Re-routed Margin 0.1730 0.0354 15 25
Depot Distance 0.4631 0.3276 3 9
Moat Packing 0.1444 0.0531 16 21
Christofides 0.2109 0.0275 10 25
60/40 Moat/Depot 0.4042 0.1239 9 15
Table 3: Median p (lower is better) and count of the number of statistically significant instances
(p < 0.05) out of the 69 instances of 10 location games and 44 instances of 20 location
games of τ for the combined Real-World datasets.
10 Locations 20 Locations All Games
Shortcut Distance 5.8% 15.9% 9.7%
Re-routed Margin 42.0% 65.9% 51.3%
Depot Distance 34.8% 38.6% 36.3%
Moat Packing 42.0% 61.4% 49.6%
Christofides 39.1% 56.8% 46.0%
60/40 Moat/Depot 42.0% 54.5% 46.9%
Table 4: Percentage of correct top elements of the Shapley ordering identified by the respective
proxy for the 69 games of size 10 and 44 games of size 20 for the combined Real-World
data.
Examining the change in performance of sophisticated proxies when moving from the Synthetic
to Real-World scenarios, the average RMSE increases from ≈ 0.075 to ≈ 0.153 while the average
τ decreases from ≈ 0.63 to ≈ 0.28. Measuring RMSE, the degradation in performance of φMOAT is
clearly the most sever. Measuring ranking error via τ , φMOAT degrades more gracefully compared
to either φCHRIS or φBLEND. Measuring all proxy performances using RMSE, φ SHORT is always
dominated by φREROUTE, which in turn is strictly dominated by the sophisticated proxies. It is worth
noting that in Real-World scenarios φREROUTE strictly dominates all the other proxies in its ability
to identify the most costly location. In that regard φMOAT is a close second. Treating ranking error,
Table 2 shows that φREROUTE actually performs comparably with best sophisticated proxy, φMOAT, in
terms of τ . Table 3 shows that the Christofides proxy φCHRIS achieves statistically significant values
for τ in the largest number of scenarios. The average ranking performance of φMOAT is relatively
low, which appears to be somewhat due to the discrepancy in the number of games of size 10 and
20. We see clearly superior ranking performance from φCHRIS for the larger games. Repeating our
observations for the synthetic corpus, in the Real-World games the sophisticated proxies have a
greater percentage of statistically significant results for τ . For a majority of the instances, φCHRIS
and φMOAT achieve a statistically significant correlation with the ranking induced by φ SV. Table 5
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Synthetic Real-World Synthetic Real-World
RMSE St. Dev. RMSE St.Dev. τ St. Dev. τ St. Dev.
Shortcut Distance 0.2965 0.0543 0.3239 0.1064 -0.0363 0.1358 0.0798 0.1891
Re-routed Margin 0.1826 0.0442 0.2902 0.0934 0.3813 0.1505 0.3476 0.1993
Depot Distance 0.0864 0.0182 0.0870 0.0303 0.5053 0.1464 0.1622 0.2313
Moat Packing 0.0758 0.0174 0.1969 0.0883 0.5304 0.1180 0.3064 0.1710
Christofides 0.0622 0.0136 0.0863 0.0311 0.5965 0.0999 0.3509 0.2258
60/40 Moat/Depot 0.0529 0.0084 0.0765 0.0301 0.6690 0.1105 0.2531 0.2487
Table 5: Comparison of performance between Synthetic and Real-World datasets for games with
20 locations. There are 20 games in the Synthetic corpus and 44 in the Real-World corpus.
Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) and Standard Deviation (St. Dev.) are reported on the
left where lower is better. On the right average KT distance (τ) and Standard Deviation (St.
Dev.) is reported where higher is better; +1 means the two lists are perfectly correlated
and −1 means the two lists are perfectly anti-correlated.
shows a side by side comparison of the games with 20 locations for the Real-World and Synthetic
data. Moving from synthetic to Real-World we see the performance of φCHRIS and φBLEND noticably
degrade, though they do continue to achieving fairly low RMSE scores. Again, it is also worth
noting that all sophisticated proxies are also good and identifying the most costly location.
Examining Real-World games with 20 locations, Figures 6 and 7 give the error scatter plots
for all proxies as a function of allocation according to φ SV. The linear component to the error
observed in Figure 5 for Synthetic data remains clear in Real-World scenarios. There is however a
more uniform distribution of errors among locations in the latter. This is evidenced by the pillar like
shapes for most of the plots; demonstrating that in the Real-World data, many of the φ SV allocations
cluster around a uniform allocation of around 5–8%. Indeed, the observed tight clustering of actual
Shapley values explains the respectable performance of φDEPOT in the Real-World datasets. The
much taller shapes we see in Figure 6 compared to Figure 7 indicate that proxy errors are more
randomly distributed among Real-World locations, and that in Real-World scenarios proxies make
proportionately larger allocation errors irrespective of the actual φ SV allocation.
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Figure 6: Absolute value of the difference between the φ SV and φ PROXY plotted as a function of φ SV
for all 44 games in the Real-World datasets with 20 locations. Note that these are log-log
plots to highlight the spread of the data.
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Figure 7: Absolute value of the difference between the φ SV and φ PROXY plotted as a function of
φ SV for all games in the Synthetic dataset with 20 locations. Note that these are log-log
plots to highlight the spread of the data.
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8. Related Work
The theory of cooperative games has a rich history in which various solution concepts for allocat-
ing costs and other quantities have been proposed (Peleg & Sudho¨lter, 2007; Young, 1994). In
addition to the Shapley value we see allocation concepts given by the core, the nucleolus and the
bargaining set. Of those, the Shapley value is considered the “most important” allocation scheme
in cooperative game theory (Winter, 2002). Application of the Shapley value spans well beyond
transportation setting. For examples, the Shapley value has been applied in allocating the cost of
network infrastructure (Koster, 2009; Marinakis, Migdalas, & Pardalos, 2008), promoting collabo-
ration between agents (Zlotkin & Rosenschein, 1994) by prescribing an allocation that incentivises
agents to collaborate in the completion of tasks, and as an incentive compatible way to share depart-
mental costs in corporations (Young, 1985). Considering applications in networks more broadly,
use of the Shapley value follows a general framework, where agents correspond to the nodes (or
edges) of a graph (Curiel, 2008; Koster, 2009; Marinakis et al., 2008; Tijs & Driessen, 1986; Aziz
& de Keijzer, 2014). Here the definition of the characteristic function depends on the application
domain, with proposed evaluations based on: (i) the size of maximum matching, (ii) network flow,
(iii) the weight of a minimum spanning tree, and (iv) the weight of a Hamiltonian cycle (Curiel,
2008; Deng & Fang, 2008). Allocation concepts are not solely devised and employed for allocating
costs and other financial quantities. For example, the Shapley value has been used directly to mea-
sure quantities indicating the importance of agents in social networks (Moretti & Patrone, 2008),
and to measure the centrality of nodes in networks (Michalak, Aadithya, Szczepanski, Ravindran, &
Jennings, 2013). Another solution concept that has been used to gauge the importance of agents is
the Banzhaf value (Banzhaf III, 1964). The Banzhaf value is defined for simple voting games – i.e.
cooperative games in which the value of the coalition is either zero or one but the Banzhaf value of
an agent can suitably be extended to general cooperative games. However, even within the context
simple voting games, the Banzhaf value is more suitable for measuring the influence of an agent
and less suitable for allocate power between agents (Felsenthal & Machover, 1998). Similarly, our
focus is to allocate costs, we focus on the Shapley value.
While solution concepts from the theory of transferable utility (TU) cooperative games (Peleg
& Sudho¨lter, 2007; Chalkiadakis et al., 2011) have been used for allocations of costs, the Shapley
allocations have rarely received serious attention in the transportation science literature. The associ-
ated computational cost is prohibitively high for the general case, and consequently strong notions
of fairness are often taken to be a secondary consideration. Though ApproShapley is an FPRAS
(fully polynomial-time randomized approximation scheme) for computing the Shapley value if the
game is convex (Liben-Nowell, Sharp, Wexler, & Woods, 2012), this does not apply for the do-
main considered in this work. Other prominent TU game solution concepts are nucleolus and core.
TSGs are introduced in Potters (Potters et al., 1992), where in addition to describing that game, the
authors describe a variety of game known as the routing game.7 you do not include this footnote,
the Tamir citation is anachronistic, we have the space, please leave it! For the latter an auxiliary
constraint forces locations to be visited, in any coalition, in the order they are traversed by a specific
tour. Assuming that the tour corresponds to the optimal for the underlying TSP, then the game has
a non-empty core. Derks and Kuipers (1997) presented a quadratic-time procedure for computing
a core allocation of the routing game. They also characterize suboptimal tours that specify routing
games with non-empty cores. It should be noted that there are no known tractable procedures to
7. Note the cited Potters et al. journal publication extends a technical report introducing the game as early as 1987.
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compute a tour which guarantees the core is non-empty for the routing game. Conditions for the
non-emptiness of the core in TSGs were further developed in Tamir (Tamir, 1989). We have already
noted that Faigle et al. (1998) developed a procedure to calculate a multiplicative ε-core allocation
for Euclidean TSGs. Yengin (2012) develop a notion of a fixed route game with appointments which
admits a tractable procedure for computing Shapley values. That model is not suitable for typical
scenarios that involve the delivery of goods to locations from a depot. TU concepts in TSGs and
routing games are developed for a practical gas delivery application in Engevall et al. (Engevall
et al., 1998).
Considering vehicle routing problems and transportation settings more generally, Go¨the-Lundgren
et al. (Go¨the-Lundgren et al., 1996) develop a column generation procedure to calculate the nucle-
olus of a homogeneous vehicle routing problem – i.e. all vehicles are equivalent. In doing so they
develop a procedure to determine if the core of that vehicle routing game is empty. Engevall et
al. (Engevall et al., 2004) extend that work for a very practical setting of distributing gas using a
heterogeneous fleet of vehicles. More recently O¨zener et al. (O¨zener et al., 2013) examine a number
of solution concepts—including allocations derived according to the nested moat-packing of Faigle
et al. (1998), and a highly bespoke approximation of the Shapley allocation—in deriving cost allo-
cations for real-world inventory routing problems. They show that TU game allocations, especially
core/duality-based allocations, have significant advantages over the existing cost allocations which
their industrial client was using.
9. Conclusions and Future Work
We studied the problem of fairly apportioning costs in transportation scenarios, specifically TSGs.
The Shapley value is a highly appealing division concept for this task. Since it cannot be evaluated
in reasonable time, we considered a number of proxies for the Shapley value. We examined proxy
performance both in terms of approximating the Shapley value and the ranking of locations induced
by the Shapley value. The stand-out proxies with respect to both measures are φCHRIS and φBLEND, a
mixture of φDEPOT and φMOAT. These proxies can be computed in reasonable time, and exhibit good
properties in both synthetic Euclidean games and real-world transportation scenarios.
Extensions of our work should develop proxies for the more general setting of vehicle routing
games, to quantify the importance of agent synergies that are unique to the multi-vehicle model.
The transport companies we interact with further seek to understand the impact of time windows
(both the duration and position of allowable service times), and the effect of delivery frequency on
allocated costs. Thus, a highly motivated and rich variety of problems is available to be considered
for future work. Additionally, future research should consider weighted Shapley values for situa-
tions where some coalitions (and therefore margins) are more likely to occur than others. Formal
approximation ratios, to complement the strong empirical evidence we obtained using sophisticated
proxies should also be the subject of future research. There also remains the need for formal studies
which employ proxy allocations to inform solutions to hard optimisation problems in transporta-
tion domains. Finally, scaling to larger transportation scenarios shall require new methods which
avoid treating all individual agents in a large monolithic evaluation of the allocation of costs. An
approximation strategy that may be fruitful here was proposed in (Soufiani, Charles, Chickering,
& Parkes, 2014), where agents are partitioned into groups and each agent in the group is assigned
the same Shapley value. Measures for clustering transport agents may appeal to proximity to pose
useful aggregations of agents.
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Appendix A. Definitions and Notations
Our work makes use of statistical measures to compare the proxies, we provide a brief overview
here and refer the reader to the textbook by Cordor and Foreman (Corder & Foreman, 2009) for a
more complete treatment. Note that abs() is the absolute value of the quantity (). Writing xˆ to for
the average of a set {x1, . . . ,xn}, the standard deviation (St.Dev) of that set is:
St.Dev =
√
∑ni=1 abs(xi− xˆ)2
n
.
The Shapley value of the ith location, divided by the sum of the Shapley values for all locations
is written φ SVi , and to denote a proxy (as in the main document) we write φ PROXYi . The absolute
percent difference between a value and its proxy is
abs(φ SVi −φ PROXYi )
φ SVi
×100.
Our study of proxy accuracy also makes use of root mean squared errors RMSE, a common
metric to express the error made over a number of predictions. Taking a TSG with locations L, the
RMSE between a Shapley allocation φ SV and a proxy φProxy is:
RMSE =
√
∑i∈L(φ SVi −φ PROXYi )2
|L| .
Shapley values can be used to rank/order locations, from least to most costly. Our work studies
the accuracy of proxies in that task using Kendall’s tau distance (KT distance), and also the KT
rank correlation coefficient, τ . The KT distance measures the amount of disagreement between two
rankings. We study the ranking of locations induced by the Shapley value and its proxies. In the
case that the rankings correspond to total orders8 the KT distance is called the bubble-sort distance,
and is equal to the number of bubble-sort swap operations necessary to make two lists agree. It is
customary to report KT distance as a normalized value (correlation coefficient) between 1 and -1,
where 1 means that two lists are perfectly correlated (equal) and -1 means that two lists are perfectly
anti-correlated (they are equal if one list is reversed).
In detail, let X and Y be two partial orders over a set of items. If a ≷ b ∈ X ∩Y then we say X
and Y are concordant on (a,b). If a = b ∈ X ∪Y then we say there is a tie, and otherwise (a,b) is
discordant. Where M is the number of concordant pairs, N discordant pairs, T ties exclusively in X ,
U ties exclusively in Y , the normalised KT distance τ between X and Y is:
τ =
M−N√
(M+N+T )× (M+N+U)
Our analysis makes use of the significance, or p-value of a KT statistic. The p-value is computed
using a two-tailed t-test where the null hypothesis is that there is no correlation between orderings
(τ = 0). This means that if we take our significance threshold α = 0.05, as is common in the
scientific literature, we can reject the null hypothesis when p ≤ 0.05. The interpretation of this
statistic is that when p≥ 0.05 we fail to reject the null hypothesis. A p-value≤ 0.05 is a statistically
significant result, meaning it is unlikely that two random, uncorrelated lists would show such a high
degree of correlation.
8. Which is always the case in our experiments.
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Appendix B. Synthetic Data
For each i ∈ [4, . . . ,35], we generate 20 instances of the Euclidean TSG with i locations occurring
uniformly at random in a square of dimension 1,000. The horizontal and vertical coordinates of the
locations are represented using 32-bit floating point numbers.
Tables 6 to 12 represent a selected amount of raw data from our experiments. The first two
tables show the RMSE and τ for various numbers of locations. The subsequent two tables show
the median and maximum (least significant) p values for the τ statistic. Finally, Table 12 gives the
percentage of correctly identified most costly locations. The tables in subsequent sections are the
same for the Real-World data.
5 Locations 10 Locations 15 Locations 20 Locations
RMSE St. Dev. RMSE St.Dev. RMSE St. Dev. RMSE St. Dev.
Shortcut Distance 0.4948 0.1379 0.3826 0.0954 0.3603 0.0806 0.2965 0.0543
Re-routed Margin 0.3951 0.1104 0.2630 0.0594 0.2061 0.0546 0.1826 0.0442
Depot Distance 0.1198 0.0579 0.0994 0.0325 0.1050 0.0263 0.0864 0.0182
Moat Packing 0.1667 0.0487 0.0879 0.0278 0.0726 0.0252 0.0758 0.0174
Christofides 0.0690 0.0292 0.0640 0.0268 0.0708 0.0229 0.0622 0.0136
60/40 Moat/Depot 0.1136 0.0483 0.0538 0.0146 0.0575 0.0115 0.0529 0.0084
Table 6: Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) and Standard Deviation (St. Dev.) for the Synthetic
data for games with between 5 and 20 locations. Lower is better.
25 Locations 30 Locations 35 Locations All Games
RMSE St. Dev. RMSE St.Dev. RMSE St. Dev. RMSE St. Dev.
Shortcut Distance 0.2830 0.0427 0.2553 0.0781 0.2437 0.0390 0.3309 0.0754
Re-routed Margin 0.1763 0.0371 0.1585 0.0455 0.1487 0.0238 0.2186 0.0536
Depot Distance 0.0843 0.0145 0.0827 0.0185 0.0771 0.0135 0.0935 0.0259
Moat Packing 0.0679 0.0146 0.0627 0.0134 0.0576 0.0092 0.0845 0.0223
Christofides 0.0610 0.0163 0.0584 0.0193 0.0568 0.0124 0.0632 0.0201
60/40 Moat/Depot 0.0514 0.0095 0.0555 0.0125 0.0539 0.0086 0.0627 0.0162
Table 7: Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) and Standard Deviation (St. Dev.) for the Synthetic
data for games with between 25 and 35 locations, as well as an average over all games.
Lower is better.
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5 Locations 10 Locations 15 Locations 20 Locations
τ St. Dev. τ St. Dev. τ St. Dev. τ St. Dev.
Shortcut Distance -0.0333 0.5153 0.0361 0.2554 -0.0220 0.1332 -0.0363 0.1358
Re-routed Margin 0.6833 0.4010 0.5333 0.1453 0.4297 0.1598 0.3813 0.1505
Depot Distance 0.6500 0.3069 0.5833 0.1422 0.5440 0.1311 0.5053 0.1464
Moat Packing 0.6167 0.4628 0.6139 0.1952 0.6055 0.1126 0.5304 0.1180
Christofides 0.8000 0.2667 0.7500 0.1770 0.6407 0.1819 0.5965 0.0999
60/40 Moat/Depot 0.7000 0.3636 0.8056 0.0986 0.7374 0.0794 0.6690 0.1105
Table 8: Average KT distance (τ) and Standard Deviation (St. Dev.) for the Synthetic data for
games with between 5 and 20 locations. Higher is better; +1 means the two lists are
perfectly correlated and −1 means the two lists are perfectly anti-correlated.
25 Locations 30 Locations 35 Locations All Games
τ St. Dev. τ St. Dev. τ St. Dev. τ St. Dev.
Shortcut Distance 0.0174 0.1093 0.0212 0.1230 -0.0132 0.0859 -0.0043 0.1940
Re-routed Margin 0.3449 0.1526 0.3406 0.0940 0.3487 0.0884 0.4374 0.1702
Depot Distance 0.5297 0.1190 0.4914 0.0924 0.4267 0.1206 0.5329 0.1512
Moat Packing 0.5315 0.1020 0.5030 0.0857 0.4938 0.0905 0.5564 0.1667
Christofides 0.6033 0.0800 0.6288 0.0736 0.5601 0.0900 0.6542 0.1384
60/40 Moat/Depot 0.6848 0.0802 0.6266 0.0765 0.5797 0.0812 0.6862 0.1271
Table 9: Average KT distance (τ) and Standard Deviation (St. Dev.) for the Synthetic data for
games with between 25 and 35 locations, as well as an average over all games. Higher
is better; +1 means the two lists are perfectly correlated and −1 means the two lists are
perfectly anti-correlated.
Number of Locations
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Shortcut Distance 0.4969 0.5316 0.5470 0.6763 0.5516 0.5495 0.6253
Re-routed Margin 0.1079 0.0371 0.0328 0.0359 0.0298 0.0079 0.0023
Depot Distance 0.1742 0.0218 0.0087 0.0019 0.0002 0.0001 0.0012
Moat Packing 0.1742 0.0123 0.0022 0.0021 0.0004 0.0002 0.0000
Christofides 0.0415 0.0035 0.0009 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
60/40 Moat/Depot 0.1079 0.0018 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 10: Median p values out of 20 games per number of locations of τ for the Synthetic data.
Lower is better, p < 0.05 required for statistical significance.
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Number of Locations
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Shortcut Distance 1.0000 1.0000 0.8695 0.9164 0.9604 0.9402 0.9882
Re-routed Margin 1.0000 0.5316 0.6222 0.5520 0.5516 0.3294 0.1680
Depot Distance 1.0000 0.2109 0.1124 0.1955 0.0594 0.0468 0.1196
Moat Packing 1.0000 1.0000 0.1394 0.0637 0.0197 0.0244 0.0067
Christofides 1.0000 0.4042 0.1394 0.0191 0.0007 0.0002 0.0029
60/40 Moat/Depot 0.4969 0.0218 0.0037 0.0107 0.0007 0.0006 0.0008
Table 11: Maximum p values out of 20 games per number of locations of τ for the Synthetic data.
Lower is better, p < 0.05 required for statistical significance.
Number of Locations
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 All Games
Shortcut Distance 35.0% 20.0% 0.0% 5.0% 0.0% 5.0% 5.0% 10.0%
Re-routed Margin 85.0% 90.0% 65.0% 65.0% 70.0% 50.0% 65.0% 70.0%
Depot Distance 75.0% 25.0% 30.0% 45.0% 20.0% 35.0% 40.0% 38.6%
Moat Packing 65.0% 80.0% 75.0% 50.0% 55.0% 50.0% 60.0% 62.1%
Christofides 85.0% 75.0% 60.0% 45.0% 80.0% 65.0% 55.0% 66.4%
60/40 Moat/Depot 70.0% 75.0% 75.0% 50.0% 65.0% 60.0% 55.0% 64.3%
Table 12: Percentage of correct top elements of the Shapley ordering identified by the respective
proxy for the 20 instances per game size for the Synthetic data.
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Figure 8: Absolute value of the difference between the φ SV and φ PROXY plotted as a function of
φ SV for all the points in the Synthetic data for all game sizes. Note that these are log-log
plots to highlight the spread of the data. This is a repeat of Figure 5
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Appendix C. Auckland Data
For Auckland we obtained 13 instances of 10 location games and 8 instances of 20 location games.
10 Locations 20 Locations All Games
RMSE St. Dev. RMSE St.Dev. RMSE St. Dev.
Shortcut Distance 0.4208 0.1140 0.3498 0.1599 0.3853 0.1370
Re-routed Margin 0.4111 0.1052 0.3222 0.1427 0.3667 0.1240
Depot Distance 0.1680 0.0923 0.0937 0.0419 0.1309 0.0671
Moat Packing 0.2079 0.0947 0.2165 0.1364 0.2122 0.1156
Christofides 0.1409 0.0731 0.0887 0.0514 0.1148 0.0623
60/40 Moat/Depot 0.1541 0.0831 0.0879 0.0414 0.1210 0.0623
Table 13: Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) and Standard Deviation (St. Dev.) for the Auckland
data for games with 10 and 20 locations. Lower is better.
10 Locations 20 Locations All Games
τ St. Dev. τ St. Dev. τ St. Dev.
Shortcut Distance 0.0470 0.3513 0.1083 0.1528 0.0777 0.2521
Re-routed Margin 0.1815 0.2986 0.2538 0.2080 0.2177 0.2533
Depot Distance 0.0085 0.3026 0.1520 0.3265 0.0803 0.3146
Moat Packing 0.2122 0.2652 0.2210 0.1528 0.2166 0.2090
Christofides 0.1068 0.3442 0.2456 0.3474 0.1762 0.3458
60/40 Moat/Depot 0.0513 0.2853 0.1886 0.3369 0.1200 0.3111
Table 14: Average KT distance (τ) and Standard Deviation (St. Dev.) for the Auckland data for
games with 10 and 20 locations. Higher is better; +1 means the two lists are perfectly
correlated and −1 means the two lists are perfectly anti-correlated.
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Median Maximum
10 Locations 20 Locations 10 Locations 20 Locations
Shortcut Distance 0.2109 0.2704 0.8348 0.8065
Re-routed Margin 0.4042 0.2053 1.0000 0.6492
Depot Distance 0.4042 0.2081 1.0000 0.9164
Moat Packing 0.4042 0.1700 0.8348 0.5754
Christofides 0.4042 0.3460 1.0000 0.9164
60/40 Moat/Depot 0.6767 0.1904 1.0000 0.7529
Table 15: Median and Maximum p values out of 13 instances of 10 location games and 8 instances
of 20 location games of τ for the Auckland data. Lower is better, p < 0.05 required for
statistical significance.
10 Locations 20 Locations All Games
Shortcut Distance 7.7% 0.0% 4.8%
Re-routed Margin 15.4% 37.5% 23.8%
Depot Distance 7.7% 12.5% 9.5%
Moat Packing 7.7% 25.0% 14.3%
Christofides 7.7% 75.0% 33.3%
60/40 Moat/Depot 7.7% 25.0% 14.3%
Table 16: Percentage of correct top elements of the Shapley ordering identified by the respective
proxy for the 13 games of size 10 and 8 games of size 20 for the Auckland data.
42
A STUDY OF PROXIES FOR SHAPLEY ALLOCATIONS OF TRANSPORT COSTS
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentage of Hybrid that is Moat
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 A
b
so
lu
te
 E
rr
o
r 
b
e
tw
e
e
n
 S
h
a
p
le
y
 a
n
d
 H
y
b
ri
d Maximum Error per Blend Percentage for Auckland
10 Players
20 Players
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentage of Hybrid that is Moat
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 A
b
so
lu
te
 E
rr
o
r 
b
e
tw
e
e
n
 S
h
a
p
le
y
 a
n
d
 H
y
b
ri
d Average Error per Blend Percentage for Auckland
10 Players
20 Players
Figure 9: Effect of the blending parameter λ on the error of Shapley allocation prediction for the
Auckland dataset. The left-hand graph shows the average worst case error that any single
location experiences, while the right-hand graph shows the average error over all loca-
tions.
Appendix D. Canberra Data
For the Canberra data we obtained 7 instances each of problems with 10 and 20 locations, respec-
tively.
10 Locations 20 Locations All Games
RMSE St. Dev. RMSE St.Dev. RMSE St. Dev.
Shortcut Distance 0.3651 0.0763 0.2827 0.0088 0.3239 0.0426
Re-routed Margin 0.3353 0.0930 0.2528 0.0149 0.2941 0.0540
Depot Distance 0.1405 0.0362 0.0870 0.0262 0.1138 0.0312
Moat Packing 0.1717 0.0696 0.1597 0.0279 0.1657 0.0488
Christofides 0.1206 0.0464 0.0830 0.0219 0.1018 0.0342
60/40 Moat/Depot 0.1291 0.0395 0.0777 0.0221 0.1034 0.0308
Table 17: Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) and Standard Deviation (St. Dev.) for the Canberra
data for games with 10 and 20 locations. Lower is better.
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Figure 10: Absolute value of the difference between the φ SV and φ PROXY plotted as a function of
φ SV for all the points in the Auckland data for all game sizes. Note that these are log-log
plots to highlight the spread of the data.
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10 Locations 20 Locations All Games
τ St. Dev. τ St. Dev. τ St. Dev.
Shortcut Distance -0.0714 0.1918 0.0126 0.1758 -0.0294 0.1838
Re-routed Margin 0.3095 0.2552 0.2239 0.2124 0.2667 0.2338
Depot Distance 0.0556 0.0985 0.0693 0.1161 0.0625 0.1073
Moat Packing 0.2505 0.2860 0.1512 0.1458 0.2009 0.2159
Christofides 0.1190 0.2109 0.2331 0.1916 0.1761 0.2013
60/40 Moat/Depot 0.1190 0.1888 0.1178 0.1632 0.1184 0.1760
Table 18: Average KT distance (τ) and Standard Deviation (St. Dev.) for the Canberra data for
games with 10 and 20 locations. Higher is better; +1 means the two lists are perfectly
correlated and −1 means the two lists are perfectly anti-correlated.
Median Maximum
10 Locations 20 Locations 10 Locations 20 Locations
Shortcut Distance 0.6767 0.3103 1.0000 0.8886
Re-routed Margin 0.2971 0.0744 0.4042 0.9721
Depot Distance 0.8348 0.3449 1.0000 0.9164
Moat Packing 0.2109 0.3818 0.8348 0.9164
Christofides 0.6767 0.1515 0.8348 0.7529
60/40 Moat/Depot 0.6767 0.2208 0.8348 0.9721
Table 19: Median and Maximum p values out of 7 games per number of locations of τ for the
Canberra data. Lower is better, p < 0.05 required for statistical significance.
10 Locations 20 Locations All Games
Shortcut Distance 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Re-routed Margin 0.0% 28.6% 14.3%
Depot Distance 0.0% 28.6% 14.3%
Moat Packing 0.0% 42.9% 21.4%
Christofides 0.0% 42.9% 21.4%
60/40 Moat/Depot 14.3% 42.9% 28.6%
Table 20: Percentage of correct top elements of the Shapley ordering identified by the respective
proxy for the 7 trials per game size for the Canberra data.
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Figure 11: Effect of the blending parameter λ on the error of Shapley allocation prediction for
the Canberra dataset. The left-hand graph shows the average worst case error that any
single location experiences, while the right-hand graph shows the average error over all
locations.
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Figure 12: Absolute value of the difference between the φ SV and φ PROXY plotted as a function of
φ SV for all the points in the Canberra data for all game sizes. Note that these are log-log
plots to highlight the spread of the data.
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Appendix E. Sydney Data
For Sydney we obtained 49 instances of 10 location games and 29 instances of 20 location games.
10 Locations 20 Locations All Games
RMSE St. Dev. RMSE St.Dev. RMSE St. Dev.
Shortcut Distance 0.4598 0.1532 0.3266 0.0976 0.3932 0.1254
Re-routed Margin 0.4288 0.1398 0.2903 0.0832 0.3596 0.1115
Depot Distance 0.1248 0.0500 0.0852 0.0269 0.1050 0.0385
Moat Packing 0.2692 0.1308 0.2005 0.0779 0.2349 0.1044
Christofides 0.1338 0.0708 0.0864 0.0248 0.1101 0.0478
60/40 Moat/Depot 0.1438 0.0687 0.0731 0.0271 0.1085 0.0479
Table 21: Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) and Standard Deviation (St. Dev.) for the Sydney
data for games with 10 and 20 locations. Lower is better.
10 Locations 20 Locations All Games
τ St. Dev. τ St. Dev. τ St. Dev.
Shortcut Distance -0.0213 0.2501 0.0882 0.1974 0.0335 0.2238
Re-routed Margin 0.4114 0.1895 0.4033 0.1681 0.4074 0.1788
Depot Distance 0.1394 0.2242 0.1874 0.2140 0.1634 0.2191
Moat Packing 0.3937 0.2306 0.3675 0.1457 0.3806 0.1882
Christofides 0.3016 0.2444 0.4083 0.1597 0.3550 0.2021
60/40 Moat/Depot 0.2563 0.2303 0.3035 0.2191 0.2799 0.2247
Table 22: Average KT distance (τ) and Standard Deviation (St. Dev.) for the Sydney data for games
with 10 and 20 locations. Higher is better; +1 means the two lists are perfectly correlated
and −1 means the two lists are perfectly anti-correlated.
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Median Maximum
10 Locations 20 Locations 10 Locations 20 Locations
Shortcut Distance 0.4631 0.4393 1.0000 0.9720
Re-routed Margin 0.1400 0.0265 0.7505 0.8546
Depot Distance 0.4042 0.3449 1.0000 0.9721
Moat Packing 0.0953 0.0328 1.0000 0.8063
Christofides 0.2109 0.0130 1.0000 0.5997
60/40 Moat/Depot 0.2971 0.0744 1.0000 0.9164
Table 23: Median and Maximum p values out of 49 instances of 10 location games and 29 instances
of 20 location games of τ for the Sydney data. Lower is better, p < 0.05 required for
statistical significance.
10 Locations 20 Locations All Games
Shortcut Distance 6.1% 24.1% 12.8%
Re-routed Margin 55.1% 82.8% 65.4%
Depot Distance 46.9% 48.3% 47.4%
Moat Packing 57.1% 75.9% 64.1%
Christofides 53.1% 55.2% 53.8%
60/40 Moat/Depot 55.1% 65.5% 59.0%
Table 24: Percentage of correct top elements of the Shapley ordering identified by the respective
proxy for the 49 instances of 10 location games and 29 instances of 20 location games.
49
AZIZ, CAHAN, GRETTON, KILBY, MATTEI, & WALSH
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentage of Hybrid that is Moat
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 A
b
so
lu
te
 E
rr
o
r 
b
e
tw
e
e
n
 S
h
a
p
le
y
 a
n
d
 H
y
b
ri
d Maximum Error per Blend Percentage for Sydney
10 Players
20 Players
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentage of Hybrid that is Moat
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 A
b
so
lu
te
 E
rr
o
r 
b
e
tw
e
e
n
 S
h
a
p
le
y
 a
n
d
 H
y
b
ri
d Average Error per Blend Percentage for Sydney
10 Players
20 Players
Figure 13: Effect of the blending parameter λ on the error of Shapley allocation prediction for
the Sydney dataset. The left-hand graph shows the average worst case error that any
single location experiences, while the right-hand graph shows the average error over all
locations.
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Figure 14: Absolute value of the difference between the φ SV and φ PROXY plotted as a function of
φ SV for all the points in the Sydney data for all game sizes. Note that these are log-log
plots to highlight the spread of the data.
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